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“A Design for Market Socialism”
by
John E. Roemer *

Abstract. Socialism is conceptualized as a society in which individuals cooperate,
distinguished from capitalism, characterized as involving ubiquitous economic
competition. Here, I embed a formal model of cooperation in an Arrow-Debreu model,
using the Kantian optimization protocol, and define a Walras-Kant equilibrium, in which
firms maximize profits, consumers choose demands for commodities in the usual utilitymaximizing fashion, and the state rents capital to firms. The labor-supply decision of
workers, however, is arrived at using the cooperative protocol. Incomes are redistributed
through a flat income tax. Walras-Kant equilibria, with any desired degree of income
equality exist, are decentralizable, and are Pareto efficient.
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In my view, the principal problem that faces the socialist ideal is that we do not
know how to design the machinery that would make it run. Our problem is not,
primarily, human selfishness, but our lack of a suitable organizational technology: our
problem is a problem of design. It may be an insoluble design problem, and it is a
design problem that is undoubtedly exacerbated by our selfish propensities, but a
design problem, so I think, is what we’ve got.

(G.A. Cohen, 2009)

1. The design problem

So wrote the philosopher G.A. Cohen in his last work, published posthumously. To
explicate the problem Cohen was describing: we know that, if economic agents are selfregarding, and a suitable set of conditions hold, then decentralized optimization in a
capitalist economy by individuals and firms engenders, at equilibrium, a Pareto efficient
allocation (the first theorem of welfare economics). Suppose, now, that individuals wish
to cooperate with each other, wish to behave in a solidaristic manner. In a word, they
possess a ‘socialist ethos.’ Is there an economic mechanism that can decentralize
decision-making in a market economy, harnessing that cooperative impulse, to deliver a
Pareto efficient and equitable allocation? This is the Cohen design problem.
In this article, I propose such a design. Cooperation is modeled as Kantian
optimization in the labor-supply decisions of workers. Kantian optimization as a method
of decentralizing cooperative behavior has been studied in Roemer [2010, 2015, in press].
What’s new about the present analysis is inserting Kantian optimization into an ArrowDebreu economy, in which firms are privately owned and maximize profits in the
traditional manner.
The models presented can be thought of as describing a blueprint for market
socialism. The market-socialist tradition proposes to replace central planning with
markets – or, in the design of Oscar Lange and Fred Taylor (1938)—with pseudo markets.
In all models of market socialism heretofore, firms have been owned by the state, or by
collectives of workers, or by other institutions, rather than by private citizens. James
Meade’s (1962) model of a ‘property-owning democracy’ achieved a degree of
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equalization of capital income by providing incentives to distribute estates in a diffuse
manner; he advocated both comprehensive education and a eugenics policy as
instruments for equalizing labor incomes. In my earlier proposal (Roemer [1994]), all
young adults were issued a property right to dividends in the nation’s publicly owned
firms; firm shares could be traded on a special stock market, but could not be liquidated
for cash. The intention was, again, to equalize (roughly) the distribution of capital
income. In Giacomo Corneo’s (in press) recent contribution, firms are again stateowned by a ‘federal shareholder,’ profits escheat to the Treasury, and are used to finance
demogrants to citizens and investment.
Market-socialist models to date have not modeled cooperation or solidarity among
citizens although these features are at the heart of the socialist ideal. Despite the
importance of cooperation to the socialist vision, existing models present no explicit
conception of how people would behave differently (cooperatively) in a socialist society
from how they behave (autarchically) in a capitalist economy. In market-socialist models
heretofore, agents are presumed to optimize in the same way that Arrow-Debreu agents
optimize, maximizing a self-regarding preference order subject to constraints. One
might suppose that socialist citizens would possess preferences with an altruistic element
in them.

However, I have not seen any market-socialist models with this property – and

in any case, if an agent is small in the economy, it is unclear whether his having a
preference order with an altruistic character would produce equilibria any different from
one in which agents are entirely self-regarding. (See Dufwenberg et al [2011].) After all,
if an agent is small, what difference would his altruistic contribution make, and would
this small contribution outweigh the personal cost he sustains by making it? The
preferences of agents are standard and self-regarding in my proposal.
Income taxation is the redistributive mechanism here. The key observation is that
Kantian (as opposed to Nash) optimization in the labor-supply decision nullifies the usual
deadweight loss incurred with income taxation. Any degree of post-fisc income equality
can be achieved without sacrificing Pareto efficiency. The economic mechanism is
decentralized, efficient, and as equal as citizens choose it to be, through a presumably
democratic choice of the tax rate.
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Combining an Arrow-Debreu structure with additive Kantian optimization offers a
solution to Cohen’s design problem. In section 2, I briefly review the definition of
Kantian optimization, and define a Walras-Kant (W-K) equilibrium with taxation. In
section 3, I present the welfare theorem: under general conditions, Walras-Kant
equilibria are Pareto efficient, at any tax rate. Section 4 presents an example. Section 5
proves the existence of W-K equilibria at almost any tax rate. Section 6 discusses the
psychology of Kantian optimization and concludes.
2. The proposed design 1

A. Kantian equilibrium in games
I begin by reminding the reader of the definition of Kantian equilibrium in a game
(Roemer [2009, 2015]). Consider a game with n agents, each of whom plays a strategy
chosen from an interval
by

of real numbers. Denote the payoff function of player i

.

Definition 2.1 An additive Kantian equilibrium of the game

is a strategy profile

such that no player would like to add any scalar to all strategies; that is:
.

(2.1)

Mathematically, additive Kantian equilibrium has a similar structure to Nash
equilibrium. The difference is in the counterfactuals the agents contemplate when
considering a deviation from a given strategy profile. In Nash equilibrium each agent
imagines changing her strategy while all other agents stand pat. In Kantian equilibrium,
each agent imagines changing all strategies in a symmetric manner. In Nash optimization,
agents imagine choosing their best option from different sets of counterfactual strategy
profiles; in Kantian optimization, all agents imagine choosing their best option from the

1

Notational conventions: Scalar variables are italic, vectors and matrices are boldface
roman. If
is a vector, then
. Denote the
partial derivative of
any real-valued function f by

.
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same set of counterfactual profiles. Choosing their favorite strategy profile from a
common set of counterfactuals is the mathematical form that solidarity/cooperation takes.

Definition 2.3 A game

is (strictly) monotone increasing if for each i,

(strictly) increasing in the strategies of all other players
(strictly) monotone decreasing if for each i,

. A game

is
is

is (strictly) decreasing in the strategies of

all other players.
Monotone increasing games are ones with positive externalities – an example being
where the strategies are contributions to a public good. Monotone decreasing games are
ones with negative externalities – an example being the tragedy of the commons.
Any additive Kantian equilibrium of a strictly monotone game is Pareto efficient in
the game. Thus, Kantian optimization decentralizes an efficient solution of games with
positive and negative externalities. It solves free-rider problems. This provides a
justification for viewing Kantian optimization as a model of cooperative behavior.

B. A labor-supply game

(i) The economic environment
I begin by defining an economic environment. There are two produced private
goods and a homogeneous kind of labor, measured in efficiency units. There are two
firms, each of which produces one of the goods from inputs of labor and capital, using
production functions G and H respectively, which map
with

. Worker i is endowed

units of labor in efficiency units, and receives a profit share
. The state owns fractions

of firm

from Firm l , for

, and is endowed with

units of

the capital good. Good 1 is used both for consumption and capital, and Good 2 is a pure
consumption good. The state uses its capital to finance investment in the two firms, and
the private agents spend their incomes on consumption of the two goods. Private agent i
has preferences over the two consumption goods and labor expended (in efficiency units)
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represented by a utility function

. All activity takes place in a single

period.
For purposes of expositional simplicity, I have specified an environment with two
produced commodities and two firms. All the results below generalize to any number of
firms producing any number of commodities, in the obvious manner.
Firms are traditional – they are price-takers and demand capital and labor and
supply commodities to maximize profits. A flat tax at an exogenous rate

will be

levied on all private incomes, with the tax revenues returned to the population as a
demogrant. Given their incomes (which consist of after-tax wages, capital income and
the demogrant) and their labor supply, producer-consumers choose the optimal
commodity bundle in the classical way. However, the determination of labor supply,
and hence of income, is non-traditional – that is to say, the worker does not choose her
labor supply in the Nash manner. A vector of labor supplies must be an additive Kantian
equilibrium of a game to be defined below.

(ii) The game
Let

be a price vector where

is the price of commodity l, w is the

wage rate for labor in efficiency units, and r is the interest rate on capital. Let
be a labor supply vector by agent i to Firms 1 and 2. Thus the vector of labors supplied
to Firm G is

and the vector of labors supplied to Firm H is
. Fix the capital levels

income of private agent i at

,

of the two firms. Define the

under an affine income tax at rate t as:
(2.2)

where the profits of the two firms are defined by:
,

(2.3)
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is the labor supplied to Firm l. The last term on the r.h.s. of (2.2) is the value of

the demogrant, equal to the per capita share of total tax revenues (where taxes are levied
on all private incomes but not on the state’s income).
The income of the state is:
.

(2.4)

That is, the state receives its share of firms’ profits plus the return on its investment, but
this is not taxed, which explains the specification of the demogrant in equation (2.2).
Now suppose that every (private) agent were to increase her total labor by a constant
, positive or negative. Then i’s hypothetical income would be:

(2.5)

where fraction

of the total increase in labor

is allocated to Firm 1, and fraction

to Firm 2. We need not adopt a rule for how each agent would allocate her
additional labor

between the two firms, as this will turn out not to matter. It is

assumed that workers are price takers: in particular, they take the wage w as given.
A comment on the logic behind equation (2.5) is in order. A Nash player, who
chooses his labor supply while assuming all other labor supplies remain fixed, need not
consider the effect of his labor-supply decision on either the profits of firms in which he
works or owns equity, or upon the demogrant, if the economy is large. Hence, our
practice in Nash-type analysis is to ignore these effects. But in Kantian optimization, the
counterfactual the worker envisages is that all workers change their labor supplies in the
same amount as the change he is contemplating, and hence consistency in the thought
experiment requires that we alter the labor supplies to firms, and the value of the
demogrant, accordingly. Hence, the formulation of equation (2.5).
At this counterfactual labor supply by worker i,

, given her income as

specified by (2.5) , let the agent compute her commodity demands, which are the solution
of the program:
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(2.6)

Denote the solution to this program by

, where I
.

abbreviate with the notation

We now define the payoff functions of a game. The payoff to agent i is his utility
at prices

if the capital invested in the firms is

labor supplies

, and the vector of

were to determine wage income, profit income, and the value

of the demogrant, that is:
.

(2.7)

Incorporated in the payoff function is the assumption that at her personal part of the
community effort vector, agent i has chosen her commodity demands optimally, given the
income generated.
Thus, given a vector of prices

, and the ownership shares of firms, a

game whose strategies are effort/labor supplies is defined, denoted

. We can define

its additive Kantian equilibrium, which is a vector of labor supplies
such that:

satisfying (2.1): that is to say, a vector

.

C.

(2.8)

Walras-Kant equilibrium with taxation
The data of the economy are

.

is the state’s endowment of the capital good, which will finance the firm’s investment. It
is useful, for conceptualizing Pareto efficiency, to define the ‘utility function of the state,’
which is:
.

(2.9)

That is, the state cares only about Good 1, which it uses in its role as the capital good.
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We now define a Walras-Kant (additive) equilibrium at tax rate t, to consist of:
i.

a price vector

,

ii.

labor and capital demands by the two firms of

iii.

labor supplies

iv.

for all private agents i, commodity demands

and

, respectively,

by all workers i to Firms 1 and 2,
for the outputs of Firms 1 and

2, resp., such that:
v.

at given prices,

maximizes profits of Firm l, for l = 1, 2,

vi.

the labor supply vector

, where

, constitutes an

additive Kantian equilibrium at the given prices of the game

, as defined in

(2.7),
vii.

maximizes the utility of agent i, given prices, her labor supply, and her
income, given by (2.2),

viii.

a supply of capital

by the state to the two firms that maximizes its utility

subject to its budget constraint
ix.

at given firm demands of labor, and
,

all markets clear; that is,
, and

.

The depreciation rate of capital is set at zero. Thus, at the beginning of the next period
the state’s endowment of the capital good will be

(see eqn. (2.4)). Indeed

condition (viii) of the definition of equilibrium is superfluous, and is included only for
completeness. For at equilibrium, the firms have maximized joint profits, at the given
price vector, which maximizes the state’s income, subject to condition that

3. The first welfare theorem for market socialism
The appropriate concept of Pareto efficiency will be called investment constrained
Pareto efficiency (ICPE).

An allocation is ICPE if there is no other feasible allocation

that makes at least some agent better off without harming any agent, where the state is

.
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included as an agent. Since the model is not intertemporal, it is important to qualify the
kind of Pareto efficiency that can be realized: citizens cannot trade off future
consumption against present consumption in the model, and hence we cannot speak of
efficiency in the full sense.

To say this more straightforwardly: the state’s investment

is determined by its endowment of capital, not by any considerations of the population’s
future welfare.

We know that both the Soviet Union and post-1949-China probably

invested too much, committing their populations to excessively low consumption. That
can happen in this model, too.
It is easy to show that, with differentiability, an interior allocation 2 is ICPE
exactly when:

(3.1)

, etc.

where

Conditions (a)-(d) specify feasibility; conditions (e)-(g) specify efficiency.

Theorem 1. Assume differentiability of the production functions and the utility functions.
Assume that the production functions are concave and the utility functions are strictly
concave. Let
equilibrium at any income tax rate

comprise a Walras-Kant (additive)
.

Then the induced allocation is investment-

constrained Pareto efficient.
2

An allocation is called interior if all private agents consume positive amounts of both

commodities and leisure, and all supply positive amounts of labor (but it is not necessary
that any agent supplies labor to both firms).
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At a Walras-Kant equilibrium at tax rate t, profit-maximization gives:
,
and clearing of the capital market tells us that

(3.2)

. Therefore, it follows from

(3.1) that an interior equilibrium is ICPE if and only if:
(3.3)
.
Proof of Theorem 1:
1. Although the theorem’s statement assumes the equilibrium is interior, this is easy to
relax, with a concomitant alteration of the first-order conditions.
2. Consider the program:

where E and I are fixed.

Denote the solution

. The f.o.c.s for the

solution of the program are:
(3.4)
By the implicit function theorem, the functions

are differentiable and their

derivatives are given by:
,

(3.5)

,

(3.6)

and

(3.7)

,

(3.8)
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is the leading principal sub-matrix of order two of the Hessian of the function

, and the superscript
indeed applies because

indicates ‘transpose.’ Note that the implicit function theorem
is negative definite by the strict concavity of

, and so the

denominators of equations (3.5)-(3.8) do not vanish.
4. Now the labor-supply vector is an interior additive Kantian equilibrium of the game
if and only if :

for all i:
for

.

(3.9)

This statement reduces to:
,
where

(3.10)

.

5. From (2.5), calculate that:

(3.11)

Since the two partial derivatives
by profit maximization, and

of the firms’ profit functions are zero,
, (3.11) reduces to:
,

for any t.

(3.12)

It is now evident why we did not have to specify how workers allocate the

increment ρ in labor between the two firms: that allocation does not affect the validity of
(3.12).
We therefore write the condition for Kantian equilibrium of labor supplies,
equation (3.10), as:
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.

(3.13)

6. We now expand equation (3.13) by making a sequence of substitutions: (i) substitute
the expressions for the four derivatives of the
(3.8), and (ii) eliminate

and

via the substitution

functions from (3.5) through
, the f.o.c. from (3.4). So

doing reduces (3.13) to:

(3.14)

where

, which is a negative number.

Finally, divide both sides of equation (3.14) by the positive number

, simplify, and

calculate that that equation reduces to:
,

(3.15)

which is one of the two required efficiency conditions for agent i.
7. Now substitute for

in the last equation using

, yielding:

.

(3.16)

By equations (3.15), (3.16) and (3.2), the theorem is proved. ν

The key move in the proof is to show that, regardless of the tax rate, when a worker
thinks of all workers as varying their labor supplies in the amount she is contemplating
varying her own, she internalizes the externality generated by her labor-supply choice – a
choice that affects firm profits and tax revenues. Her own action causes a negligible
change in these magnitudes, but of course the aggregate effect of many small changes is
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significant. The additive counterfactual in the universal change in labor supplies and
affine income taxation combine in such a way as to exactly cancel the deadweight loss of
taxation that afflicts Nash optimization in the labor-supply decision. (This is the meaning
of equation (3.12), the key to the proof.) This kind of pairing – associating a specific
cooperative optimization protocol with a particular allocation rule, where the two
together deliver Pareto efficiency – is a feature of Kantian equilibrium in simpler (nonmarket) environments, as studied in Roemer (in press). What’s new here is combining
additive Kantian optimization with markets.
A remark on why the incentive problem, causing deadweight losses in the standard
model, does not bite here. Consider, for dramatic effect, an income tax rate of one, and
suppose every worker is supplying zero labor (as she would in the standard model at this
tax rate). But here, by using the Kantian optimization protocol, a worker balances her
share of an increase in income that would occur if all workers increased their labor
supply from zero to some small positive ρ against her (very small) disutility of labor at
zero. The trade-off is usually worth it. Consequently, at the Kantian equilibrium, even
at a tax rate of unity, (most) workers will supply a positive amount of labor.

4. An example of Walras-Kant (additive) equilibrium
Because capital allocation is passive in this model, let’s simplify by studying an
economic environment where the capital inputs are fixed, there is no state, and we model
production as a function of labor only:
(3.17)

Agent i’s endowment of efficiency units of labor is
endowment of labor is

.

We let

. There are n agents, and the total
for all

. We normalize the price vector by choosing

. We set
There is no market for

capital and hence no interest rate.
An interior allocation is a Walras-Kant (additive) equilibrium at income tax rate t
when the allocation is Pareto efficient, the income of i is given by (2.2), and markets
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clear. (The critical condition that the labor supplies comprise a Kantian equilibrium of
the game

is embedded in the efficiency conditions, as the proof of theorem 1 shows.)

We write these conditions as:

(3.18)

and (2.2) holds for all i.

By (3.18), the post-fisc income of agent i is given by
. Hence, (2.2) can be written:

.

(3.19)

By adding up the equations over all i in (3.18), we have:
(3.20).
Now using the expressions for commodity prices in (3.18), we write these equations as:
.
System (3.21) comprises two equations in the two unknowns
must be a vector

and

(3.21)
; the solution

. Thus total production at Walras-Kant

equilibrium for this economy, if such exists, is independent of the tax rate t. Profits are
also independent of t. Taxation simply redistributes a fixed output of commodities.
Parameterize the example with
yet specified the individual endowments

,
.

We have not

We solve (3.21):
.

(3.22)

Profits are positive for both firms, and comprise 28% of national income, a reasonable
approximation to reality.
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To complete the analysis, we must specify the

and solve for

. Rewrite

equation (3.19) as:
.

(3.23)

Examination shows that equation (3.23) possesses an interior solution in which
for all i exactly when:
.

for all i,

(3.24)

If, on the other hand, (3.24) is false for some i, then there is no interior equilibrium.
It is of interest to compute the lower bound on the labor endowment that will
guarantee an interior Walras-Kant equilibrium at tax rate t.

From (3.24) , this depends

upon the tax rate. We compute this lower bound for various tax rates for our example:

Table. The minimum value of

supporting an interior Walras-Kant equilibrium

as a function of the tax rate
Recall that the average labor endowment with our parameterization is

. From

the table, a Walras-Kant (additive) equilibrium exists where all agents work regardless of
the distribution of individual labor endowments, as long as
rises, the restriction on the distribution of labor endowments bites.

. But as the tax rate
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For tax rates larger than 40%, equilibrium still exists, but workers who are
insufficiently skilled do not work. We illlustrate with a second paramaterization. The
utility functions and production parameters are as before, but we examine an economy
with two agents (n =2), where

. If both agents work, then

are given by (3.22). Let us look for an equilibrium where

. Both agents must then

have the same after-tax income. Inequality (3.24) is false for agent 1, so there is no
equilibrium at
zero:

where both agents work.

We therefore set agent 2’s labor supply to

. The other equations characterizing a Walras-Kant equilibrium are:

(3.25)

The two equations in the first line say the marginal rates of substition for the agent with
positive labor supply equal the correct price ratios; the second line says the marginal rates
of transformation equal the correct price ratios; the third line is true because when the tax
rate is 1, both agents have the same (post-fisc) income, and so consume the two
commodities identically; the fourth line expresses market-clearing for the two
commodities; and the fifth line expresses the efficiency condition for the agent who
supplies zero labor. The solution is given by:
(3.26)

5. Existence of Walras-Kant equilibrium
We first note:
Proposition 2 Let

be a Walrasian equilibrium at

Then it is also an additive Walras-Kant equilibrium at
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Proof:
We know the allocation is Pareto efficient by the (usual) first welfare theorem. The
income equation (2.2) holds by definition of Walrasian equilibrium. We need only show
that the labor supplies comprise a Kantian equilibrium, which is to say, that equation
(3.13) holds. But we have shown that this is equivalent to the efficiency conditions that
. These conditions hold by hypothesis, and the claim is proved.

ν

We assume:
Assumption A
(i)

are unbounded, concave, homothetic, and the Inada conditions hold, and

(ii) all consumer preferences are representable by strictly concave, differentiable
utility functions, and both commodities are normal goods for all consumers.

Theorem 3 Let an economic environment
A hold. Suppose that

be given and let Assumption

for all (private) agents and that

Walras-Kant equilibrium exists for any

Let

.

be the 3-simplex of price vectors

(interior) of the simplex by

. Then a

. Denote the boundary

. We define a correspondence on the domain

Let Q can be any real number, and

a positive continuous function on

.

. Let:

(4.1)
Now define

by:
,

where

(4.2)

may be positive, zero, or negative. Finally, define:
.

(4.3)
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Lemma 4 Let

and

. Let

functions for all i. If Assumption A(ii) holds then
function mapping

be continuous
is a (non-empty) continuous

.

Proof:
1. It suffices to show that

is single-valued and continuous for any i. By strict

concavity of preferences, the correspondence
Suppose that

is single-valued and continuous on

.

contains two elements; i.e., there are allocations
for

, with

. It

follows that:
,
where

(4.4)

, etc. Therefore the quantities on the right-hand sides of the two

equations in (4.4) are equal, implying that:
,
and so

(note

(4.5)

by assumption). Therefore :
(4.6)

and so either

. But since

must be that

, it

because both commodities are normal goods, and the

consumer’s wealth (check the definition of
contradiction proves that
2. Next we show

for

) is greater at

than at

. This

contains at most one element.

contains at least one element.

segment. We say a point

is a planar

lies above (resp. below) the planar segment

if it lies in the positive orthant and
).

(resp.,

Note that the points on planar segment

lie entirely below (or, at one point, on) the planar segment

because:
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.

(4.7)

lies below (or possibly on) the planar segment

It therefore follows that

. On the other hand, for large values of Q, the points of

must lie entirely above

. Since

is a continuous function of Q, by the

Berge maximum theorem, it follows that there exists at least one value of Q such that
. Thus,
3. Continuity of

is a well-defined function.

follows from Berge’s maximum theorem. ν

Proof of Theorem 3:
0. The theorem is true for
at

by Proposition 2, since a Walrasian equilibrium exists

under the stated premises. Henceforth, we assume

.

1. The proof is an adaptation of Mas-Colell, Winston and Green’s (1995) proof of
existence of competitive equilibrium (Proposition 17.C.1). We will define a
correspondence that maps the 3-simplex
correspondence on

into itself. We first define the

. Given a price vector

define

to be the solution of:

(4.8)

Note that, by Assumption A(i) the solution exists and satisfies:
.
2. The profits of the two firms and the value of the demogrant are defined at
. Profits are positive for any price vector

.

We now consider the budget constraints of individuals:
(4.9)
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and the budget constraint of the state at the firms’ demands:
.
Let

(4.10)

equal the sum of the last two terms on the r.h.s. of (4.9). By the theorem’s
, because the

premise, all private agents have positive income at any

state does not receive all the firms’ profits by assumption, and the tax rate is positive.
are positive continuous functions, and so the premises of Lemma 4 hold; therefore
are defined and continuous. Henceforth, we write

the functions
.

4. Define the excess demand functions at a vector

:

,

where the points

for

(4.11)

. Define the excess demand function for the

economy by:
.

(4.12)

by:

Next, define the correspondence

.
is non-empty and convex because it consists of the maximanda of a linear function
on a compact set.
5. Finally, for

, define:
.

(4.13)

6. By summing the budget constraints in (4.9) and (4.10), we calculate Walras’ Law for
this economy, defined on

:
.

(4.14)

May 31, 2017

21

7. Suppose

is a fixed point of

, a contradiction. Therefore

simplex, since we would have
follows by the definition of
implies that

. p cannot be on the boundary of the

and Walras’ Law that

. It

for all

. Suppose one of the components of

. This

were negative. This

would imply the failure of Walras’ Law, a contradiction. Hence

. Consequently

, and all markets clear. We deduce
premise that

from the

.

8. Associated with these prices is an allocation
. We must show that

, with

for all

is an additive Kantian equilibrium at prices p.

This follows immediately from the definition of the functions

, because the first-order

conditions for Kantian equilibrium, which were derived in steps 5,6, and 7 of the proof of
Theorem 1, follow from the definition of

, given that

.
9. Thus, a fixed point of

is a Walras-Kant equilibrium at tax rate t. To show the

existence of a fixed point, we need to check that the premises of Kakutani’s fixed point
theorem hold.
in

is obviously convex-valued. Upper-hemi-continuity of

at any point

follows quickly.
Finally, we examine u.h.c. of

Suppose

. Suppose the sign pattern of

have

.

Eventually

is (+,+,0,+). We

are positive and bounded

.

away from zero, and
We must show that
assume that

at points on the boundary of the simplex.

. Without loss of generality, we may

for all j. Denote the excess demands at

by

. We will show that, for j sufficiently large
,

(4.15)
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and this will imply that, for sufficiently large j,
, for

we will show that
We show that

.

To show (4.15),

.
. We know

, because

, and so the

firms will demand unbounded amounts of labor, while the supply of labor is bounded. If
were bounded above, we would be done. So we suppose that

is

unbounded. It follows that for at least one firm – say the G firm -. But by profit maximization,
homotheticity of G (Assumption A(i)), the points
any ray in the positive quadrant of

. By
must eventually lie below

space. This implies that

, as

required.
To show

for

, it suffices to show

because the

demand for the two commodities cannot grow faster than total profits (wage income goes
to zero). We show

. Let j be large and

. Then:
, (4.16)

, etc., and so:

by concavity of G, where

. (4.17)
Now let

, but j more slowly than J. We know from above that
, and

hand side of (4.17) approaches zero, and so

, and

. Therefore the right, as was to be proved.

We examine one more case on the boundary of the simplex. Suppose the sign
pattern of

is (0,+,0,+). Then

.

We know that
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and eventually

are bounded away from zero. If eventually
, then eventually

is greater than

.

Firm 2 eventually demands huge amounts of labor, because the wage goes to zero but the
price of output is significantly positive. The profits of Firm 1 go to zero since
These facts imply that

.

and so, as in the first case examined above,

dominates the other excess demands, as required.
The other cases of points on

yield to similar analysis. Hence, the premises of

Kakutani’s theorem hold, and a fixed point in

, which is a Walras-Kant equilibrium,

exists. ν
A comment on investment in the model is called for. In the approach I’ve taken,
only the state invests.

Could private agents invest in the firms as well, and preserve the

efficiency result? The answer is yes, if the profile of investments is also an additive
Kantian equilibrium.

I elected not to follow this route here, both for reasons of

simplicity, and because it strikes me as more credible that workers can learn to adopt
Kantian optimization in their labor-supply decisions than in their investment decisions.
Perhaps I am here influenced by the observation that workers have a history of
cooperation, and investors do not, at least to the same extent.

6. The psychology of Kantian optimization

The differentia specifica of the model here proposed, within the class of marketsocialist models, is Kantian optimization in the labor-supply decision. I have argued that,
because socialism has always been conceived of as a society with enhanced cooperation
among its members, this formalization of what cooperation entails should be welcome.
That a more robust form of cooperation has not been included in designs for market
socialism heretofore is due, I suggest, to the lack of a formal representation of
cooperative behavior.
It will surely be the case that skepticism regarding my proposal will focus upon the
realism of supposing that a large population of producers can learn to optimize their
labor-supply decisions in the Kantian manner.

There are, I think, three necessary
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conditions for the feasibility of such behavior: desire, understanding, and trust. Citizens
must desire to cooperate with each other, they must view themselves as part of a
solidaristic society, whose members believe that cooperation in economic decisions is the
modus operandi. But why should the Kantian optimization protocol appeal to people as
the preferred mode of cooperation? I think the motivation must be in the conception of
fairness or solidarity embodied in the statement, “I should only reduce (increase) my
labor supply if I would like all others to reduce (increase) their labor supplies in like
manner 3.” Our brains love symmetry, and fairness always, I believe, involves a
conception of symmetrical treatment. Secondly, people must understand that
cooperation in the labor-supply decision is achieved by each knowing that if all increase
their labor supply by a small increment, each person’s income increases by that increment,
because what a worker loses in the tax on her wage, she gets back in the increased
demogrant. They should also understand that, if workers optimize according to Kantian
protocol, efficiency is separated from distributional considerations. Thirdly, they must
trust that others will behave cooperatively as well, and will not take advantage of their
own cooperative behavior, by optimizing in the Nash manner. If these three conditions
are met, then the method of implementing cooperative behavior is not difficult: each
worker should choose his labor supply to equalize his marginal rates of substitution
between commodities and labor to his gross wage, rather than his after-tax wage. Rather
than thinking “Is the disutility of an extra day’s work worth to me the after-tax wage
increment?” the worker should ask whether it is worth the gross wage increment. If we
believe people are capable of optimizing in the Nash manner, optimizing in the Kantian
manner is no more cognitively demanding, if the necessary conditions are met.
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